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INTRODUCTION
In Butzin v. Wood,' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the admissibility of two incriminating statements2 made by the de-
fendant in a homicide case. Both statements were used at trial and
the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The court
found it unnecessary to address the adequacy of the Miranda warning
issued before the first statement by determining the second state-
ment was volunteered, thus rendering Miranda inapplicable. The
court determined that the strength of the second statement coupled
with other untainted evidence provided sufficient basis to support
the conviction and render admission of the first statement harmless
error.
This comment first examines the evolution, creation, and applica-
tion of the Miranda standards. Although not intended to be a com-
prehensive review, this brief examination of fifth amendment law will
help put the Butzin decision in the proper context. Second, the Butzin
analysis will discuss the majority opinion and Chief Judge Lay's dis-
sent regarding separation of the two confessions, and the application
of the harmless error rule to a Miranda question. The majority's
1. 886 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1989).
2. This comment follows the Eighth Circuit's lead and uses the terms "incrimi-
nating statements" and "confession" interchangeably.
1
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opinion in Butzin illustrates how the courts are moving away from
strict enforcement of rules and consequently, protection of individ-
ual rights.
I. MIRANDA: CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE RULE
A. Pre Miranda: The Voluntariness Standard and Totality of
Circumstances Test
The United States Constitution provides one of the most impor-
tant protections against self-incrimination. Specifically, three in-
dependent constitutional doctrines limit police interrogation aimed
at obtaining incriminating information from a suspect: the four-
teenth amendment due process clause, the fifth amendment, and the
sixth amendment.3 The fourteenth amendment due process clause
provides that no state shall deprive a citizen of due process of law.4
The fifth amendment protects a suspect from compelled self-incrimi-
nation.5 The sixth amendment insures that each person accused of a
crime will have the assistance of counsel for their defense.6 In 1963
and 1964, the Supreme Court held that fifth and sixth amendment
protections applied to the states through the fourteenth
3. Shulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 866-67 (1981).
The author reviews the book Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy
by Yale Kamisar. Both authors illustrate how the Supreme Court has subtly chipped
away at individual rights when confessions are involved.
4. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963) (Court held that a coerced
confession was constitutionally impermissible); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568
(1958) ("[Tlhe admission in evidence.., of the coerced confession vitiates the judg-
ment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (Court set aside a conviction based on a
confession obtained by protracted questioning, threats of mob violence and the de-
fendant being held incommunicado, based on due process grounds); White v. Texas,
310 U.S. 530, 533 (1940) (considered a coerced confession and held that due process
commanded that the practice not be used); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
240-41 (1940) (Court found that coerced confessions were a lawless means used to
achieve the end result and so they could not be allowed as evidence under due pro-
cess standards). See also Crossley, Miranda and the State Constitution: State Courts Take a
Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693, 1697 (1986) ("During the 1950s and 1960s the
Supreme Court. . . 'nationalized' federal constitutional rights by selectively incorpo-
rating most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment's
prohibitions.").
5. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
6. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
[Vol. 16
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amendment. 7
Historically, the Court's approach to confession cases was rooted
in the use of a voluntariness test which examined.the circumstances
surrounding the confession to see if the suspect did in fact confess
voluntarily. In 'the 1884 decision of Hopt v. Utah, the United States
Supreme Court, for the first time, held that confessions based on
promises or inducements by individuals conducting the interroga-
tion are not voluntary and are thus inadmissible.8 The Court relied
on the evidence law notion that confessions which did not arise vol-
untarily were not trustworthy. 9
Shortly after Hopt, the Supreme Court widened the scope of the
involuntary confessions rule in the 1897 decision of Brain v. United
States.IO The Court held that confessions induced by police threats
render the confession inadmissible."I Resting its decision on the
fifth amendment, the Bram Court stated:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, whereever
[sic] a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because
not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."' 12
Because the fifth amendment did not reach state actions until
1964, coerced confessions obtained by state officials posed an en-
tirely different problem for the Court. In the 1936 decision of Brown
v. Mississippi, the Court addressed this problem with the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.13
In Brown, the defendants were indicted on murder charges and
pleaded not guilty.'4 After a one day trial, the defendants were con-
7. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (Court found the fifth amendment's
protection against self-incrimination applied to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (Court found the sixth amendment's right to counsel
applied to the states).
8. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
[T]he confession appears to have been made either in consequence of in-
ducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the
charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of
such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in
reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control
essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.
Id.
9. D. NISSMAN, E. HAGEN & P. BROOKS, LAW OF CONFESSIONS, 4-5 (1985).
10. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
11. Id. at 542-43.
12. Id. at 542.
13. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (Court found the conviction
void for lack of due process).
14. Id. at 279. After the indictment, one or more of the defendants offered to
plead guilty but the state court declined to accept. Id. at 284.
1990]
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victed and sentenced to death.15 The defendants argued that their
confessions were inadmissible because they were obtained through
physical torture.' 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
convictions, holding that the actions by the state officials violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.17 The Court
noted that: "The State is free to regulate the procedure of its courts
in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing
it 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' "18 The
Court in Brown used a coerced confession rule to exclude incriminat-
ing statements eficited by police tactics that were "revolting to the
sense of justice."t9 Thus in Brown, the Court found whipping the
suspects with a buckle-studded leather strap to be revolting to the
sense of justice.
In later confession cases, the Court began to develop the totality
of circumstances analysis. For example, in 1961 the Court in Culombe
v. Connecticut set forth a three-pronged test for evaluating the volun-
tariness of a confession.20 The Culombe Court stated that first, the
15. Id. at 279. The convictions were based solely on the confessions. Besides the
confessions, there was no evidence sufficient to warrant a jury trial. Id.
16. Id. at 281-82. One of the suspects had been hung from a tree and whipped
until he confessed. The other two suspects were taken to jail, forced to strip and lay
naked over chairs, and were whipped with a leather strap. The deputy made it clear
that the beatings would continue until they confessed in the manner demanded. In-
deed, the beatings did continue until the suspects confessed. Id.
17. Brown, 297 U.S. 278, 287. The Brown Court relied on the fourteenth amend-
ment because the coercion was by state officials and not federal officials. Id. at
285-86.
18. Id. at 285 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Rogers
v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (1905)).
19. Id. at 286. The Brown Court stated: "It would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the sense ofjustice than those taken to procure the con-
fessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis
for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process." Id. Although the
Court in Brown concentrated on the brutality element as rendering the confessions
inadmissible, it later concentrated on other factors. The Court found that psycholog-
ical overbearing rendered confessions inadmissible. See Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (isolating suspect for 16 hours and refusing to allow him to call
his wife constituted coercion); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (threat-
ening suspect with loss of financial aid and her children constituted coercion); Rog-
ers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541-44 (1961) (threatening to bring suspects ailing
wife to the station constituted coercion); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 209
(1960) (suspect's mental incompetence coupled with a lengthy interrogation in a co-
ercive atmosphere rendered confession inadmissible); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 323 (1959) (threatening suspect with a friend losing his job constituted
coercion).
20. 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961). In Culombe, a suspect was interrogated for several
weeks, regarding a series of holdups and holdup killings. Id. at 570. The interroga-
tion was aimed specifically at obtaining a confession. Id. at 625. After four nights
and five days of being in custody of the police, the suspect confessed. Id.
[Vol. 16
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atmosphere surrounding the interrogation must be examined.21
Second, the Court considered the psychological factors and mental
capacity of the suspect.22 Third, the Court analyzed the facts with
respect to the mental condition of the suspect. 23 Justice Frankfurter
stated, there is "[n]o single litmus-paper test for constitutionally im-
permissible interrogation[s] . *."..24 Thus, several factors, analyzed
in light of the surrounding circumstances, determine whether a con-
fession is voluntary.25
Soon state courts began achieving inconsistent results, and the
Supreme Court realized that the Culombe test was ineffective in elimi-
nating coercive interrogations.26 The Supreme Court had left state
courts with an imprecise standard which invited subjective judicial
interpretation of the voluntariness evaluation.2 7 This imprecise
standard resulted in the admission of confessions of questionable
constitutionality.28
In 1964, the Supreme Court supplemented from the coerced con-
fession doctrine with two decisions based on the Sixth Amendment.
In 1964 the Supreme Court in Massiah v. United States, recognized a
suspect's sixth amendment right to consult with an attorney after be-
21. Id. at 603 (the external events and occurrences surrounding the confession
must be examined).
22. Id. ("[B]ecause the concept of'voluntariness' is one which concerns a mental
state, there is the imaginative reaction, largely inferential, of internal, 'psychological'
fact.").
23. Id. (psychological facts must be applied to the standards for judgment in-
formed by legal conceptions of rules of law).
24. Id. at 601.
25. Id. at 602 (each of the following must be considered: duration and condition
of detention, police attitude displayed toward the defendant, defendant's physical
and mental state, any pressures that affect his ability to resist coercion or exert self
control).
26. Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness, " Test, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 59, 94-104 (1966) (dis-
cusses the weaknesses of the coerced confession doctrine).
.27. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859,
863 (1979). "The Court's general unwillingness to articulate the policies underlying
volitional terminology explains the ambiguity of [the] voluntariness doctrine .... "
Id. Compare Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel:
Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 72 (1966). "Judi-
cial decisions speak in terms of the 'voluntariness' of a confession, but the term itself
provides little guidance."
28. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99. The
precise reach of Escobedo was clouded by language and an express limitation to the
facts of that case. This ambiguity resulted in a considerable amount of confusion
among state courts. Id. at 103. See also Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court:
Trends and Countertrends, 13 Lov. U. CH. L.J. 405, 414 (1982) (To solve the problem of
state courts allowing the usage of coerced confessions, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Miranda to provide concrete constitutional guidelines for the courts to
follow.).
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ing indicted.29 The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
begins at the post indictment stage of a criminal proceeding.30
Shortly after Massiah, the Court's 1964 decision in Escobedo v. Illi-
nois,31 extended the right to counsel to include interrogations con-
ducted before the indictment stage.32 Although Escobedo clearly
articulated that "[olur Constitution ... strikes the balance in favor of
the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege
against compelled self-incrimination,"33 other factors of the decision
were left open to inconsistent interpretation by state and federal
courts.3 4 It was this difference of interpretation which paved the way
for the decision in Miranda v. Arizona.
B. Miranda v. Arizona
In Miranda v. Arizona, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home
and taken to a Phoenix police station for questioning.35 Without be-
ing advised of his right to have counsel present, Miranda responded
to the interrogations by executing a written confession.36 The writ-
ten confession was admitted into evidence and Miranda was found
guilty of kidnapping and rape. 37
Preceding the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, most criminal confes-
sions arose from incommunicado interrogations in police dominated
29. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (Court held that Massiah was denied the guarantee
of the sixth amendment when statements he made in the absence of counsel were
used against him at trial).
30. Id. at 205.
31. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the suspect was brought to the police sta-
tion to be questioned about the murder of his brother-in-law. The suspect was told
that a friend had already implicated him in the murder. Id. at 479. Also, the suspect
was not allowed to see his lawyer who was waiting in the hall during the interroga-
tions. Id. at 481-82. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction noting that the
interrogation was not a general questioning but was focused on obtaining a confes-
sion. Id. at 485-86. The Court determined that the suspect's sixth amendment right
to counsel was violated by not allowing him to consult with his lawyer before interro-
gation. Id. at 490-91.
32. Id. at 490-91. The Court stated: "no meaningful distinction can be drawn
between interrogation of an accused before and after formal indictment." Id. at 486
(citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964)).
33. Id. at 488.
34. See Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 193, 208 (1987). These factors include at what point the investigation is fo-
cused enough on the defendant to require counsel and when does general question-
ing become actual interrogation.
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491-92 (1966).
36. Id. at 491-92. The top of the statement contained a paragraph stating that
the confession was made voluntarily and with full knowledge of legal rights. Testi-
mony indicated that this paragraph was not read to Miranda until after he had con-
fessed orally. Id.
37. Id. at 492.
[Vol. 16
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atmospheres. Police overreaching, physical brutality, and psychologi-
cal coercion were common.38 Although the "bright line" rule set
forth by Miranda is judicially created, its aim is to protect the fifth
amendment right against compelled self-incrimination specifically
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.39
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona concluded that the pro-
cess of in-custody interrogation contains inherent pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist, compelling them to
speak where they ordinarily would not.40 The Court indicated that
custodial interrogations create a presumption of coercion and that
the "atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation."41 The Mi-
randa Court observed that statements obtained from a defendant
cannot truly be a product of free will unless adequate protective
measures are taken to dispel the compulsion which is inherent in cus-
todial interrogations.42
The Miranda Court focused on the reoccurring constitutional
problems surrounding custodial interrogations while actually decid-
ing four cases: Miranda v. Arizona,43 Vignera v. New York, 44 Westover v.
United States,4 5 and California v. Stewart.46 First addressing the
problems inherent in custodial interrogation, the Court developed
guidelines requiring a warning and an express waiver before a con-
fession could be admissible. The Court then applied the guidelines
to the facts of each case. 47
The Court's focus on the inherent coercion present during custo-
dial interrogations was central to its holding.48 The Miranda Court
recognized that in modern interrogation practices, coercion is
38. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (eight or nine hours
of sustained interrogation constituted psychological coercion resulting in an involun-
tary confession); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (confession deemed
coerced where foreign suspect was interrogated for eight hours and was repeatedly
denied access to counsel); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1940) (psy-
chological coercion found where suspects were interrogated throughout the night,
without food or rest); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (physical tor-
ture used by police to obtain confessions rendered confessions inadmissible).
39. For text of fifth amendment, see supra note 5.
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
41. Id. at 457.
42. Id. at 458.
43. Id. at 491.
44. Id. at 493.
45. Id. at 494.
46. Id. at 497.
47. Id. at 491-99.
48. Id. at 461. The Court noted that "[a]n individual swept from familiar sur-
roundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to
the techniques of persuasion . ..cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak." Id.
1990]
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rooted in psychological rather than physical influences. 49 The Court
examined various police interrogation manuals and other materials
revealing an arsenal of psychological tactics used to elicit confessions
from suspects during custodial interrogations.50 These manuals sug-
gested that the interrogation be done privately and in the investiga-
tor's office, to deprive the suspect of any psychological advantage.5l
Interrogators were instructed to offer the suspect a legal excuse for
the action.52 If these tactics failed, interrogators turned to a ploy
referred to as a "Mutt and Jeff" act.53 Confessions induced through
trickery were the end result of a tactic which utilized a line-up.54 Fi-
nally, if the suspect refused to discuss the matter entirely, or asked
for an attorney, the interrogator conceded the right to remain si-
lent.55 The Court concluded that the interrogation environment was
designed to destroy the will of the suspect and that these incommu-
nicado interrogations are directly opposed to the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination.56
The Miranda Court held that a suspect's in-custody statements
49. Id. at 448. "[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and.., the blood of
the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Id.
50. See id. at 448-56.
51. Id. at 449 (the primary factor leading to a successful interrogation is privacy).
52. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451-52. The Court noted an example of this tactic be-
ing used on a person suspected of revenge-killing would be:
"Joe, you probably didn't go out looking for this fellow with the purpose of
shooting him. My guess is, however, that you expected something from him
and that's why you carried a gun-for your own protection. You knew him
for what he was, no good.... [H]e gave some indication that he was about
to pull a gun on you, and that's when you had to act to save your own life
Id. (quoting F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 40
(1962)).
53. Id. at 452. The Mutt and Jeff act involves two agents, one hostile and the
other kindhearted. The kindhearted agent attempts to identify with the suspect by
disagreeing with the other agent's hard-nosed tactics, and offers to remove him from
the case provided the suspect cooperates. The agent notes that he would not be able
to hold off his partner for very long. Thus, the suspect is forced into making a quick
decision. Id.54. Id. at 453. The suspect is put in a line-up and confidently identified by the
witness or complainant. The questioning is then resumed with the aura that there is
no question of guilt. The reverse line-up is a slight variation on this technique. The
accused is placed in a line-up and identified by several fictional witnesses or victims
for different offenses. The goal is that the suspect will confess to the questioned
offense to escape false accusations related to the other offenses. Id. (citing C.
O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 106 (1956)).
55. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 453-54. After the suspect has been impressed with the
apparent fairness of the interrogator, the interrogator points out the incriminating
significance of the suspect's refusal to talk.
56. Id. at 457-58 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice."). Id. at 458.
[Vol. 16
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would be admissible only if the prosecution established that the
proper warnings had been given, and the suspect had voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights.57 The Court noted
that any evidence of trickery will indicate that the suspect did not
voluntarily waive the privilege.58 However, the Court extended its
examination of coercion to provide that lengthy interrogation or in-
communicado incarceration prior to a confession, provides evidence
that the accused did not validly waive their rights.59
Miranda required that suspects be advised of their right to remain
silent and to be informed that any statement they make may be used
against them. In addition, the Court required that suspects be in-
formed of the right to have their own attorney, or to have one ap-
pointed if they could not afford one.60 The Court held that a suspect
must be clearly informed of the right to have an attorney present
before answering questions. 6 1 The Court noted that a mere warning
administered by the interrogators is not sufficient to insure an un-
coerced choice between silence and speech.6 2
The Miranda Court found that having counsel present at the inter-
rogation is beneficial in several respects. Counsel can mitigate the
danger of untrustworthiness if a suspect decides to talk to the inter-
rogators.63 Also, the likelihood of coercion is reduced by having
counsel present.64 Moreover, if coercion is implemented, the lawyer
can testify to it in court.65 Finally, a lawyer can also guarantee the
statement was accurately given to the police and accurately reported
at trial.66
The Court also laid out a procedural framework to be followed if
suspects exercise their right to remain silent or requests to speak
with an attorney. If suspects exercise their right to remain silent,
"interrogation must cease." 67 If the suspect requests assistance of
counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
57. See id. at 444-45, 476, 479.
58. Id. at 476 ("[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or ca-
joled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive
his privilege.").
59. Id. "[T]he fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration
before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive
his rights." Id.
60. Id. at 444.
61. Id. at 472.
62. Id. at 469-70. "The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by
his interrogators." Id. at 469.
63. Id. at 470.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 473-74.
1990]
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present."68
The decision in Miranda, however, does not mandate that volun-
teered confessions be barred by the fifth amendment. The Court
recognized that confessions need to remain an essential element in
law enforcement, so long as they are given freely and voluntarily,
without any compelling influence. 69 The Court noted, however, that
a suspect's waiver of the right to remain silent or to have an attorney
present during interrogation, would be subject to close scrutiny.70
The Court also added that implying a waiver from a suspect's mere
silence would not pass constitutional muster.7' Thus, the Miranda
decision did not completely bar the use of volunteered statements as
a tool of law enforcement. 72
In dissenting opinions, Justices Clark, Harlan, White, and Stewart
objected to the requirements imposed on law enforcement officials
by the majority.73 Justice Clark argued that the totality of the cir-
cumstances test utilizing the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, provides the best alternative for judicial re-
view because of its flexibility.74 Justice Harlan, also advocating use
of the totality of the circumstances test, argued that balancing soci-
ety's need for effective law enforcement against individual constitu-
tional rights is more appropriately done through the totality of the
circumstances test. 75 Justice White argued that the bright-line rules
created by the majority saddled law enforcement with rigid guide-
lines that would interfere with effective investigation and prosecu-
tion.76 Despite the dissent's arguments, the 5-4 majority concluded
that a bright-line rule was necessary to combat over-zealous police
interrogations .77
C. Post Miranda: Narrowing the Doctrine
From the time it was handed down in 1966, the Miranda decision
68. Id. at 474.
69. Id. at 478. The Miranda Court pointed out that its decision does not bar the
confession of a person "who enters a police station and states that he wishes to con-
fess to a crime." Id.
70. Id. at 475-76. "If the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney .. a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defend-
ant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to retained or appointed counsel." Id. at 475.
71. Id. at 475.
72. See Note, Miranda and the Rehnquist Court, 30 B.C.L. REV. 523, 539 (1989) (not-
ing that confessions gained during interrogation are only admissible if preceded by a
warning of the accused's rights and a knowing and intelligent waiver).
73. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499-545.
74. Id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 544-45 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 467-69.
[Vol. 16
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has been surrounded by controversy and debate.78 A key reason be-
hind the Warren Court's decision in Miranda was the dissatisfaction
with the traditional due process/voluntariness test as the guarantee
against unfair interrogation practices. 79 Thus, the Court granted
certiorari in Miranda, to lay down "concrete constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement agencies to follow."8 0
Advocating individual rights as opposed to balancing them with
society's interests, the Warren Court adopted the philosophy that in-
dividual rights under the Constitution were absolute and could not
be abridged by a societal interest.81 The Warren Court's application
of the totality of the circumstances test, did not abolish it; it simply
focused the test on a determination of the voluntariness of a sus-
pect's waiver.82 Subsequently, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
have used the totality of the circumstances test to broadly interpret
the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver.83 Essentially, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have modified the applicability of the rules set
forth in Miranda by balancing society's interest in law enforcement
with individuals' rights. 84 The cases that follow serve to illustrate the
Supreme Court's struggle in applying the bright-line rule set forth in
Miranda.
In 1974, in Michigan v. Tucker, the Burger Court faced the issue of
whether a suspect could waive constitutional rights after a less than
full Miranda warning.85 In Tucker the defendant was brought to the
station for questioning in connection with a rape and beating of a
78. See Sonenshein, supra note 28, at 405-34 (noting the dismay with which Mi-
randa was received by "law-and-order" politicians and prosecutors and subsequent
liberties taken with the Miranda precedent in post-Miranda decisions).
79. Id. at 413.
80. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
81. Id. at 479. See also, Note, supra note 72, at 553 (the author argues that the
trend is to move away from this liberal idea as the Court becomes more
conservative).
82. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76.
83. See Note, supra note 72, at 554 (arguing that this broad analysis reviews the
"totality of the circumstances" test rejected in Miranda). For other Supreme Court
cases addressing some aspect of the rights set forth by Miranda see Colorado v.
Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (holding that a suspect's awareness of all crimes about
which the suspect may be questioned is not relevant in determining validity of
waiver); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the state needs to
prove waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence); Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding that Miranda does not require reversal where
police fail to inform an accused of attorney's telephone call since the level of police
culpability in this regard had no bearing on validity of waiver); Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that police-initiated interrogation is not valid after the
accused exercises the accused's Miranda rights, even if police read the Miranda rights
a second time).
84. See Note, supra note 72, at 554.
85. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 435 (1974).
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woman.8 6 Prior to interrogation police read the suspect his rights,
but omitted the portion informing him of his right to appointed
counsel.87 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals holding that police had not denied the suspect
his privilege against self-incrimination.8 8 The Tucker Court noted
that the purpose of the fifth amendment is to prevent governmental
influence on a suspect's decision to confess.89 Also instrumental to
the Court's decision was its return to balancing law enforcement and
societal interest with individual rights.90
Justice Douglas argued in his dissenting opinion that the Miranda
decision required both a full warning and a valid waiver in order to
protect the fifth amendment right.9' Justice Douglas argued that be-
cause Tucker had not been given a complete warning, his confession
should have been inadmissible.92
In Rhode Island v. Innis,9 3 the Court addressed the problem of de-
fining what constitutes interrogation. Specifically, the Court was de-
ciding whether any conversation, apart from direct questioning,
could be termed part of interrogation for Miranda purposes. 94 In
Innis, the suspect was arrested for robbing a cab driver at gun
point.95 Before being put in a police car for the ride to the station,
the suspect was informed of his Miranda rights and indicated that he
wanted to speak to a lawyer.96 During the ride and in front of the
suspect, three officers discussed the danger of many handicapped
children in the area, and the possibility that one might find the sus-
pect's hidden shotgun.97 The suspect then interrupted and volun-
teered to show the officers where the gun was located.98 The
Supreme Court reversed the Rhode Island Supreme Court holding
86. Id. at 435-36. A dog was found in the home of a raped and beaten woman.
The dog was later followed to the defendant's home by police and further connected
with the defendant by a neighbor. Id.
87. Id. at 436.
88. Id. at 437-38.
89. Id. at 439-40. See also Comment, Waiving Miranda Goodbye?, 21 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 239, 253 (1987) (critical of the idea that no official intervention equals involun-
tary statements that arose in the Colorado v. Connelly and Colorado v. Spring holdings).
90. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450.
91. Id. at 462 (Douglas J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 463 (Douglas J., dissenting).
93. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
94. See Sonenshein, supra note 28, at 435.
95. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293-94. The cab driver noticed a picture of his assailant on
a police bulletin board while waiting to make a statement. Id. at 293.
96. Id. at 294.
97. Id. at 294-95. An officer stated: "'there's a lot of handicapped children run-
ning around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells
and they might hurt themselves.' " Id. (quoting Patrolman Gleckman's testimony).
98. Id. at 295.
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that the shotgun and testimony relating to it, were not products of
interrogation.99
The Innis Court noted that Miranda applies whenever a suspect in
custody is exposed to "direct questioning or its functional
equivalent."' 00 Further defining the rule, the Court stated that po-
lice practices which are reasonably likely to invoke incriminating re-
sponses from a suspect, will be deemed interrogation.lOt
Ten years later the Supreme Court affirmed Tucker in New York v.
Quarles, holding that an absence of warnings did not require a pre-
sumption that compulsion in violation of the fifth amendment had
taken place.102 In Quarles, a woman approached a patrol car and in-
formed police officers that she had just been raped. lOS After describ-
ing her assailant, she told the officers that he had gone into a nearby
grocery store and was carrying a gun.104 Before formally arresting
the suspect and reading him a Miranda warning, the officers noticed
the suspect's shoulder holster was empty and inquired as to the
whereabouts of the his gun.' 0 5 The suspect nodded toward some
empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over there."' 06 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals,
holding that the gun and statement were admissible and not in viola-
tion of Miranda.107
Creating a public safety exception to Miranda, the Court stated
that "a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the prophylac-
tic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-in-
crimination."108 Examining Miranda's doctrinal underpinnings, the
Court reasoned that Miranda need not be applied in full force to a
situation where officers ask questions reasonably grounded in con-
cern for public safety.109 The Court pointed out that instead, the
warnings required by Miranda are largely based on an attempt to re-
duce the likelihood of unconstitutional interrogation practices used
in the "presumptively coercive environment of the station house."" I 0
99. Id. at 302.
100. Id. at 300-01.
101. Id. at 301.
102. 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
103. Id. at 651.
104. Id. at 651-52.
105. Id. at 652.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 653.
108. Id. at 657. The Court argued that if police were required to recite warnings
where there was an immediate necessity for information, suspects might well be de-
terred from answering and thus a danger to public safety may be allowed to exist. Id.
109. Id. at 656 (1984).
110. Id.
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Thus, the Quarles Court balanced the need for public safety against
individual rights, the very thing that Miranda had abolished.
The Court further modified the application of Miranda in Duck-
worth v. Eagan.l, In Duckworth, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a departure from the precise language of the warning set
forth in Miranda adequately informed the suspect of his fifth amend-
ment rights. Duckworth involved a suspect being questioned on two
occasions in connection with a stabbing.112 Prior to the first round
of questioning, the suspect was informed that he had the right to talk
to a lawyer, and to have that person present before and during ques-
tioning.13 The warning also included that the police had no way of
giving the suspect a lawyer, but that one would be appointed if and
when the suspect went to trial.14 After spending approximately
twenty-nine hours in lockup, the suspect was given another warning
informing him that an attorney would be provided if he did not hire
one.' 1 5 Following the second warning and subsequent questioning,
the suspect confessed to the stabbing and led officers to the scene
where they recovered the knife used in the crime.116
Reversing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals," i7 the Supreme
Court held that the Miranda warnings given to the suspect sufficiently
informed him of his fifth amendment right, and thus the statements
and evidence were admissible.118 The Court pointed out that the
decision in Miranda in no way requires that a warning be given in the
identical form mandated in Miranda v. Arizona."19 The Court noted
that the Miranda warnings themselves are not protected by the Con-
stitution, but instead are safeguards to insure the right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination.20 The Duckworth Court concluded the
111. 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
112. Id. at 2876-78.
113. Id. at 2877.
114. Id. The warning.provided: "You have [a] right to the advice and presence of
a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a
lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court."
Id.
115. Id. at 2877-78.
116. Id. at 2878.
117. Id. The seventh circuit court held that the "if and when you go to court"
language included in the first warning, was " 'constitutionally defective because it
denies an accused indigent a clear and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed
counsel before any interrogation' and 'link[s] an indigent's right to counsel before
interrogation with a future event.' " Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 843 F.2d
1554, 1557 (1988)).
118. Id. at 2878-79.
119. Id. at 2879. " '[T]he "rigidity" of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise
formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant,' and that 'no talismatic in-
cantation [is] required to satisfy its structures.' " Id. (quoting California v. Prysock,
453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981)).
120. Id. at 2880.
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question is, whether the warnings reasonably convey the rights as
required by Miranda,121 and not whether the warnings are technically
correct.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.22
The Justices argued that "[a] clear and unequivocal offer to provide
appointed counsel prior to questioning is . . . an 'absolute prerequi-
site to interrogation.' "123 The dissent also argued that the "if and
when" caveat may give the accused the impression that only those
who can afford an attorney have the right to have one present prior
to questioning; and those less fortunate must wait until trial. 124 The
dissent concluded that the warning linked the appointment of coun-
sel to some point in the future, and thus did not clearly advise the
suspect of his right to appointed counsel before and during
interrogation. 125
The preceding, cases illustrate how the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have continually modified the application of Miranda. The
Court's broad interpretation of constitutionally permissible law en-
forcement action limits application of Miranda's bright-line rules.
Law enforcement conduct which might not have satisfied Miranda
under a totality of circumstances analysis during the Warren Court
years, may pass constitutional muster today.
II. BUTZIN V. WOOD
A. Facts
David Leon Butzin was convicted of second-degree murder for the
deaths of his wife, Melody, and his eighteen month-old son, Alex. 
126
On August 14, 1985, the bodies of Melody and Alex were recovered
from Cat Creek in Wadena, Minnesota. Autopsies revealed that the
cause of the deaths was drowning, and the sheriff believed the deaths
were accidental. However, two days after the bodies were recovered,
a local insurance man informed the sheriff that David Butzin had
purchased a substantial amount of insurance on his wife just before
her death. Further investigation revealed that Butzin had insured his
wife's life for a total of $239,000 and his son's life for $6,000, leaving
himself as the sole beneficiary. 127
Two weeks after discovering the bodies, a Wadena County Deputy
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2885-93.
123. Id. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 471 (1966)).
124. Id. at 2886-87.
125. Id.
126. Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1989).
127. Id.
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requested that Butzin come to the law enforcement center.128 Upon
arrival, Butzin was informed that he was to be questioned regarding
the deaths of his wife and son. Butzin and the deputy entered a pri-
vate office and Butzin was read the following warning: "[Y]ou have
the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you
in court. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed for you at no cost."' 129 The warning
omitted language indicating the right to have counsel present during
questioning. Unaware of this omission Butzin answered the ques-
tions put to him by the Wadena County Chief Deputy Sheriff and a
retired Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Agent. During
the one hour interview Butzin stated he was unaware when his wife
and son had died.130
Butzin was then interviewed one-half to one hour by a private in-
vestigator hired by Wadena County to help with the investigation.' 3'
After the private investigator left the office the first two interrogators
returned. They resumed the questioning for approximately fifteen
to twenty minutes and then left. The private investigator then re-
turned to the office, and found Butzin crying with his head in his
hands. The private investigator said, " 'David, you're in a world of
hurt, aren't you?' . . . 'Why don't you tell me what happened out
there at Cat Creek, David?' Butzin answered, 'I lied, I was
there.' "132 Butzin stated that his wife and son fell into the water and
that he panicked and ran away. The private investigator left the of-
fice and told the deputy and the retired agent what Butzin had said.
They returned to the office. Butzin confessed that what he had said
was only partially true "because he had bumped [his wife and son]
into the creek and then watched [them] both float down the stream."
He also stated that he had unsuccessfully attempted to rescue them.
Butzin signed a written, statement to this effect and was then ar-
rested.133 After spending the night in jail, and following breakfast
the next day, Butzin requested to speak with the deputy. Butzin then
confessed that he had "not been totally honest [with the deputy] the
day before."' 134 The deputy asked him if he remembered his rights
from the day before and Butzin stated that he did. The deputy then
inquired about Butzin's dishonesty. Butzin responded that his wife's
death was not accidental; "he had pushed her into the creek because
he wanted her to die and .. .he knew she could not swim."' 135
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1017-18.
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Butzin contended that admission of his statements was contrary to
the mandates of Miranda because he was not informed of his right to
have counsel present during the interrogation.13 6 The United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota denied Butzin's petition
for writ of habeas corpus.' 37
B. Majority's Opinion
In affirming the district court, the Eighth Circuit focused on the
admissibility of the second confession by separating it from Butzin's
confession made the previous day and determining that the second
confession was not the product of interrogation.1s The court also
reiterated the fact that Miranda warnings are required only when a
suspect is to be subjected to in-custody interrogation.39
The Eighth Circuit Court held the second confession to be volun-
teered and admissible because Butzin initiated the conversation with
Deputy Young.140 The Butzin court cited United States v. Rhodes,14t
for the proposition that " 'a spontaneous admission made under cir-
cumstances not induced by the investigating officers, or during a
conversation not initiated by the officers,' " will not be protected by
Miranda.142 The court reasoned that because Butzin had already
made a statement, and was under no pressure from the authorities to
say anything more, he voluntarily gave the amended confession.143
The court determined the second confession was not a product of
interrogation. The Butzin court noted that an officer's attempt to
clarify an ambiguous statement is generally not construed as interro-
gation under Miranda "'if the question does not enhance the defend-
136. Id. at 1018.
137. Id. at 1016.
138. Id. at 1018. The court stated, "[w]e do not believe that Butzin's ultimate
confession, although he was unquestionably in custody at the time he made it, was
the product of interrogation." Id.
139. Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (procedural safe-
guards outlined in Miranda are only required when a suspect in custody is subjected
to an interrogation, not simply when suspect is taken into custody)).
140. Id. "The state court's factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of
correctness in a habeas proceeding, and we presume that Butzin initiated the conver-
sation ... " Id. (citations omitted).
141. 779 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1985). In Rhodes, an officer picked up a notebook
while executing a search warrant. The suspect responded by saying, "[y]ou can't take
that" and the officer replied, "[wihy?" The suspect answered "I can't run my busi-
ness without that." The court held the statements admissible because they were
spontaneously volunteered and were not made in the course of interrogation. Id. at
1032.
142. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1018 (quoting Rhodes, 779 F.2d at 1032).
143. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1018. The court assumed, "[a]pparently for his own rea-
sons he wanted to give an honest account of the events leading to the deaths of his
wife and child." Id.
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ant's guilt or raise the offense to a higher degree."14 4
Additionally, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Oregon v. Elstad. 145 In Elstad, the Supreme Court pointed out that all
voluntary confessions proffered after a prior unwarned statement are
not necessarily inadmissible.146 Thus, the Butzin court concluded
that because the second confession was voluntary and more prejudi-
cial, admission of both confessions was proper regardless of whether
or not the first confession was preceded by an adequate Miranda
warning. 147
The majority then turned to the admissibility of the first confes-
sion to determine whether the statement was a product of interroga-
tion and made in a custodial setting. However, the court found it
unnecessary to reach the custodial interrogation question because it
determined any error in admission of the first confession "would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'i48 The court noted that But-
zin's appellate brief characterized his first confession as an accidental
disclosure. The majority also noted that Butzin's first confession was
a "manslaughter-type confession" and certainly not what convicted
him. 149
The Butzin court butressed the harmless error determination with
three other pieces of evidence. The majority noted that Butzin had
made two other inculpatory statements which were admitted at trial.
In the first statement, Butzin told his wife's father that he was re-
sponsible for her going into the water. In the second statement, But-
zin told a deputy while being transported to court, "I know that I am
guilty and that I have done wrong, but I have to go to court to beat
it. It's the best chance I have."50 The court also noted the jury had
heard evidence of the insurance coverage Butzin had purchased on
his wife a couple of weeks before her death.
An interesting question is raised by the strength of these three
pieces of evidence. If the interrogation did in fact turn custodial
when Butzin rendered his first confession, would Butzin's lies lead-
ing up to and including the first confession, coupled with evidence of
the insurance policy, the statement made to his wife's father and the
statement made on the way to court, provide sufficient basis to up-
144. Id. (quoting W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7, at 301
(1985)).
145. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
146. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
147. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1018.
148. Id. at 1019 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Howard v.
Pung, 862 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1988)).
149. Id.
150. Id. This admission of guilt came after Butzin had inquired about the strength
of the case against him, and had received an answer from the deputy. The deputy
told Butzin that he believed the case against Butzin was strong. Id..
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hold the conviction? Arguably so, but one can only speculate why
the Eighth Circuit majority did not employ this analysis.
Finally, the majority rejected Butzin's claim that his confessions
were not voluntary. The court noted the record failed to indicate
improper conduct on the part of the police while interrogating But-
zin. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's conviction
of Butzin for second-degree murder.
C. Chief Judge Lay's Dissenting Opinion
ChiefJudge Lay asserted that the Butzin majority failed to address
the main issue of the appeal. Instead of focusing on the critical issue
of whether Butzin was given an adequate warning under Miranda v.
Arizona,15l the majority failed to reach the Miranda question by spec-
ulating that the confession made on the second day of incarceration
was voluntary and concluding it was more prejudicial than the previ-
ously rendered confession.152
The Supreme Court in Miranda enumerated several procedural
safeguards to be employed by law enforcement authorities.15 The
Miranda decision specifically mandates that a suspect held for inter-
rogation clearly be informed of the right to consult with a lawyer
before interrogation, and to have the lawyer present during
interrogation. 154
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
Butzin's Miranda warning consisted of the following: "David, you have the right to
remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right
to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you at no
cost."
153. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. The Court held:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpa-
tory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it dem-
onstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination .... Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive ef-
fectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speak-
ing there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has con-
sulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
154. Id. at 471. The Court stated: "we hold that an individual held for interroga-
tion must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to
have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the
privilege we delineate today." Id. The Court further noted three reasons for its deci-
sion in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963), which required the right to have coun-
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ChiefJudge Lay argued the Supreme Court decision in California v.
Prysock 155 reaffirms the Miranda requirement that a warning must
clearly inform a suspect of the right to counsel before and during
interrogation. Even though the Court in Prysock held that no talis-
manic incantation is required to satisfy the requirements of Mi-
randa, 156 the decision in no way "erode[s] the necessity for a
[suspect] to be clearly informed of [their] right to speak with a lawyer
before and during... interrogation."157 The Butzin majority's appli-
cation of Prysock suggests that Prysock allows law enforcement offi-
cials to omit portions of the warning, as well as tailor the manner in
which the warning is given. The Prysock Court held that warnings
need not be given in the exact form mandated by Miranda v. Arizona,
so long as the warnings convey all of the enumerated rights. The
majority reasoning in Butzin not only obviates the need for "talis-
manic incantations," but also eliminates the necessity of a complete
Miranda warning.
In Duckworth v. Eagan,t58 the Supreme Court again affirmed the
principal that a suspect must be informed of the right to have a law-
yer present at the time of interrogation. Although in a close 5-4 de-
cision the Court found the Miranda warning in Duckworth adequate, it
pointed out that warnings which fail to " 'apprise the accused of
[their] right to have an attorney present if [they] [choose] to answer
questions'" will be inadequate.159 The Court went on to say that
" '[t]he warnings in this case did not suffer from that defect.' "160
The warnings in Butzin v. Wood clearly suffer from this defect because
Butzin was not informed at any time of the right to have counsel
present if he chose to answer questions.161
The Eighth Circuit majority disposed of the right to have counsel
sel present during interrogation: (I) to insure police interrogation conforms to the
right against self-incrimination, (2) to insure the statements made are not a product
of compulsion, and (3) to enhance the integrity of the fact finding process in court.
Id. at 466.
155. 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981).
156. Id. at 359. The Court reasoned that the decision in Miranda requires either
the Miranda warnings themselves, or their functional equivalent. Id. at 359-60.
157. Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
ChiefJudge Lay noted that many cases support this position. See, e.g., United States
v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1984) (Miranda warning held incomplete where de-
fendant was not informed of right to counsel during interrogation, as well as before);
South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973)
(warnings held inadequate where defendant was not advised that he had the right to
the presence of an appointed attorney prior to questioning).
158. 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
159. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1022 (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Duckworth, 109 S. Ct.
at 2881).
160. Id. at 1021 (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2881).
161. Id. at 1022 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
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present by conceding that Butzin was in custody, but that his second
confession was not a product of interrogation and was volun-
teered.162 Chief Judge Lay noted the majority opinion implicitly as-
sumed Butzin's rights were violated by the incomplete warning.
However, the Butzin majority determined the error of admitting the
first confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
while in custody, Butzin came forward and volunteered a more in-
criminating statement.' 63
The heart of Chief Judge Lay's argument asserted that to say But-
zin's second statement was not in response to the previous day's in-
terrogation is unrealistic. By focusing on the second confession, the
majority failed to realize Butzin's second confession may have been a
product of the first confession. Had a proper Miranda warning been
given on the first day, before the interrogation, it is uncertain
whether Butzin, knowing he had right to counsel before or during
interrogation, would have rendered the first incriminating statement
or volunteered another the following day.164
Chief Judge Lay disagreed with the Eighth Circuit majority's reli-
ance on the Supreme Court decision of Oregon v. Elstad.165 In Elstad,
the defendant received a full and proper Miranda warning between a
first and second confession.166 The Chief Judge noted the separa-
tion of two incriminating statements in Elstad was proper because
Elstad had received a full Miranda warning before he made the sec-
ond statement and waived his fifth amendment right.167
Butzin, however, involves facts clearly distinguishable from those in
Elstad. Butzin was never properly informed of his fifth amendment
rights. The deputy warned Butzin, "[y]ou have the right to remain
silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have
the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you at no cost."i 6 8 This warning, given to Butzin
before the initial interrogation, failed to inform him of his right to
consult with a lawyer before questioning and to have the lawyer pres-
ent during interrogation.169 Unlike Elstad, Butzin was not given the
opportunity to intelligently waive his fifth amendment right because
he was never completely informed of his Miranda rights.
Chief Judge Lay asserted that by labeling the first confession
harmless, the majority "misconceives and misunderstands the
162. Id. at 1018.
163. Id. at 1022 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
164. Id. (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
165. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
166. Id. at 301-02.
167. Id. at 318.
168. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1017.
169. Id.
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message of Miranda."70 The judicially created rights of Miranda are
aimed at protecting the fifth amendment right against compulsory
self-incrimination. The applicability of Miranda does not turn on the
degree of guilt which the statements reveal.171 Nor does it matter
whether the statements are of an inculpatory or exculpatory na-
ture.1 72 The Eighth Circuit majority noted that Butzin's first state-
ment was not very incriminating and that the first confession was
"'not the stuff of premeditated murder, rather, arguably it's [a] man-
slaughter type confession and was certainly not what convicted him.
The second statement * * * provided the proof of intent.' "173 But-
zin's admission of being at the scene of the crime, which he denied
before, was intended to be exculpatory, but was inculpatory. No-
where in the Miranda decision does it allude to the necessity of evalu-
ating the prejudicial nature of a statement. Miranda prevents
admission of unwarned statements whether they are slightly incrimi-
nating or not incriminating at all. 174
Chief Judge Lay argued the majority's application of Elstad to this
critical issue failed to recognize the two confessions cannot be sepa-
rated. Upon request, Butzin voluntarily went to the sheriff's office.
After making a somewhat incriminating confession, he was arrested
and taken into custody. The following day, while still in custody,
Butzin rendered an additional statement.' 75 The Chief Judge cited
Westover v. United States,176 arguing the proposition that two confes-
sions obtained through multiple interrogations spanning a two-day
period cannot be separated because the interrogations appear to the
suspect as a "continuous period of questioning."177 Because Butzin
was interrogated, arrested and held overnight in the compelling at-
mosphere of the law enforcement center, it is difficult to determine
exactly when he no longer felt the effects of the custodial interroga-
tion. Thus, it is extremely difficult to determine whether Butzin's
second confession was truly voluntary.
Chief Judge Lay indicated the majority's use of the harmless error
rule short circuits Miranda by eliminating the need to examine the
interrogation. If an interrogation is custodial, suspects are entitled
170. Id. at 1022.
171. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
172. Id.
173. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1022 (Chief Justice Lay quoted the majority which was
relying on arguments raised by Butzin's attorney).
174. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
175. Id. at 1022 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
176. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 494 (Westover v. United States, consolidated with Miranda).
177. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1022. In Westover, the Court found a defendant could not
have waived his fifth amendment rights subsequent to receiving a Miranda warning
after a fourteen hour, two day interrogation, because to the defendant it was a con-
tinuous period of questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 496.
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END RUN OF MIRANDA
to be informed of their Miranda rights.178
In Butzin, the interrogation should have been deemed custodial.
After the first interrogation, a private investigator hired by the
county questioned Butzin. Shortly thereafter, two officers again in-
terrogated Butzin for about fifteen to twenty minutes. After the two
officers left, the private investigator re-entered the room and ob-
tained Butzin's remark: "I lied, I was there." The private investiga-
tor told the two officers of Butzin's statement and they returned to
the interrogation room. The deputies undoubtedly returned in-
tending to elicit further incriminating statements from Butzin.
Although Butzin went to the station voluntarily, and had not yet ad-
mitted to a role in the crime itself, the interrogation had become
custodial because the deputies would likely have restricted Butzin's
liberty had he tried to leave. Thus, a custodial interrogation com-
menced at this stage, if not before.179
CONCLUSION
The Butzin majority end runs the rights laid down in Miranda by
beginning the analysis with the second confession and thus eliminat-
ing the need to examine the Miranda warnings. Even if Butzin's sec-
ond confession was volunteered, the majority could at best, only
speculate whether Butzin would have rendered the more incriminat-
ing second confession had a proper Miranda warning been issued
before the first confession. Similar to the majority's analysis, Chief
Judge Lay's dissent also engages in speculation. However, common
sense indicates that Butzin would probably not have given the sec-
ond confession if he had not made the first admission the day before.
To say the second confession is totally independent of the first is
unrealistic.
Alternatively, the Butzin majority could have upheld the conviction
by excluding the written portion of Butzin's first confession and his
second confession. Because Butzin went to the law enforcement
center voluntarily, the need for a Miranda warning was not triggered
until Butzin contradicted his previous statements and admitted hav-
ing been at the crime scene. Butzin admitted, "I lied, I was there."
Conventional wisdom suggests that Butzin was no longer free to
leave. At that point, probable cause existed to arrest him and an
adequate Miranda warning was necessary.
Arguably, the evidence up to and including Butzin's oral admis-
sion of being at the crime scene, coupled with the evidence of insur-
ance policies, the admissions made to his wife's father and to the
deputy on the way to court, provides a sufficient basis to render ad-
178. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
179. Butzin, 886 F.2d at 1023 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
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mission of the written portion of the first confession and the second
confession harmless error. This analysis is consistant with Miranda.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Butzin v. Wood reflects the clash
between preservation of individual fifth amendment -rights and soci-
ety's interest in protecting the public from crime. The Butzin deci-
sion arouses differing reactions from two separate schools of
thought. Those who subscribe to the idea that society's greatest
threat derives from the unbridled masses and advocate criminal ap-
prehension at virtually all costs, should find solace in the Butzin deci-
sion. Conversely, the Butzin decision should also strike fear in the
hearts of those who feel strongly about individual rights and believe
society's greater threat arises from organized government.
Robert T. Brabbit
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss3/7
